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ARCHITECTS OF JUSTICE:  
THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE AND RESOLVING 
WHETHER INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
IS MATERIAL UNDER THE BRADY RULE 
Blaise Niosi* 
 
Independence is my happiness, and I view things as they are, 
without regard to place or person; my country is the world, 
and my religion is to do good.1 
 
In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the prosecution 
has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant’s 
guilt or punishment upon request.  The Court’s subsequent expansion of its 
holding in Brady has formed the “Brady rule,” which requires the 
prosecution to learn of and to disclose to the defendant all material 
exculpatory and impeachment information.  The Court defined “material” 
as information that would cause a reasonable probability of a different trial 
outcome had it been disclosed. 
Currently, a circuit court split exists regarding whether evidence is 
material for purposes of the Brady rule if it is inadmissible at trial.  This 
split of authority reflects longstanding tension underlying the Brady 
doctrine but was incited by the Court’s ambiguous holding in Wood v. 
Bartholomew.  The conflict has substantial repercussions in practice 
because the U.S. Department of Justice directs federal prosecutors to 
follow their offices’ local disclosure precedent.  Because disclosure 
precedent may vary by office, prosecutors’ understanding of their 
constitutional disclosure duty may be inconsistent.  This could lead to the 
alarming result of disparate defendant treatment based solely on the 
jurisdiction where the defendant is charged. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2008, University of 
Manchester; B.A., 2006, Skidmore College.  Thank you to Professor James L. Kainen for his 
insight and guidance, and to my friends and family for their support.  I would especially like 
to thank the professors, attorneys, and prosecutors with whom I have had the privilege of 
working, and those whose work I simply admire from afar, for being a source of tremendous 
inspiration. 
 
 1. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, PT. 2 (1792), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 345, 414 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1969). 
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This Note examines the conflict and analyzes the prosecutor’s role, 
concluding that the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict by ruling that 
inadmissible evidence may nonetheless be material if its disclosure would 
yield admissible evidence.  This Note ultimately argues, however, that 
enduring Brady disclosure reform must be affected from within the 
prosecutor’s office. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Brady v. Maryland,2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal 
defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
are violated when the prosecution fails, irrespective of good or bad faith, to 
disclose upon request evidence favorable to the defendant’s guilt or 
punishment.3  The Court subsequently expanded this complicated holding4 
in a series of opinions that create the “Brady rule.”5  The Brady rule 
imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution to review and to disclose 
without request any exculpatory or impeachment evidence known to the 
prosecution team and material to guilt or punishment.6 
A “Brady violation” is a breach of the prosecutor’s broad duty to disclose 
exculpatory material evidence.7  This information is often referred to as 
“Brady material.”8  To claim a Brady violation, the defendant must 
demonstrate three factors:  (1) that the prosecution willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed evidence; (2) which is favorable to the defendant as exculpatory 
or impeaching; and (3) is material to an issue at trial.9  This Note focuses on 
an issue of the “materiality” factor. 
Thirty-two years after Brady, the Court was confronted with a problem of 
materiality.  In Wood v. Bartholomew,10 the Court ruled on whether results 
of a polygraph test were material under Brady despite being inadmissible at 
 
 
 2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 3. See id. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 4. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir. 1984) (characterizing 
Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion for the Court as “unfortunately unanalytical”). 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 61 
(2013) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 676 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87). But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-5.001(B) (2010) 
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov 
/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html (noting that although the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office (USAO) recognizes that “[g]overnment disclosure of material exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence is part of the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial. . . .  Neither the 
Constitution nor this policy [of disclosure], however, creates a general discovery right for 
trial preparation”). 
 7. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
 8. See Failure to Disclose, OPEN FILE, http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/ 
defining-misconduct/failure-to-disclose/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 9. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82; United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 
1995); see also Randall D. Eliason, The Prosecutor’s Role:  A Response to Professor Davis, 
AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF 15, 19–20 (2006), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/ 
clb/documents/CriminalLawBrief-VolIIIssueI-Fall2006.pdf (discussing the “harmless error” 
doctrine as applied to Brady violations and noting that “most cases involving allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct are upheld under the ‘harmless error’ doctrine” because the “events 
labeled ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial or call 
into question the result, and thus do not require a new trial”). 
 10. 516 U.S. 1 (1995). 
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trial.11  The Court held that the polygraph results were immaterial because 
they were inadmissible and rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
results were material because they could have led to admissible evidence as 
too vague.12 
The federal courts of appeals have subsequently interpreted the Wood 
opinion differently, resulting in a split of authority over whether evidence 
inadmissible at trial may nonetheless be material for Brady purposes.13  The 
conflict is comprised of three primary interpretations of the Brady rule’s 
materiality requirement.  First, that inadmissible evidence is per se 
immaterial.14  Second, that admissibility is a factor of materiality.15  Lastly, 
that evidence is material if its disclosure would create a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome at trial.16 
This conflict is a “matter of some confusion in federal courts”17 with 
significant practical repercussions18 warranting examination in this Note.19  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) directs its federal prosecutors to 
“evaluate their discovery obligations” by “consider[ing] circuit and district 
precedent.”20  Each U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) is “direct[ed] to 
develop a discovery policy that reflects circuit and district court precedent 
 
 
 11. See id. at 6. 
 12. See id. at 8. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 18. See Jeffrey L. Bornstein, Leanne E. Hartmann & Laura A. Brevetti, DOJ’s New 
Guidance on Criminal Discovery Practices:  How Much Has Changed?, K&L GATES LLP 
GOV’T ENFORCEMENT ALERT 2 (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/dojs-new-guidance-
on-criminal-discovery-practices-how-much-has-changed-01-27-2010/ (noting that the 
Department of Justice directs each USAO to develop a discovery policy that reflects that 
office’s circuit court’s precedents and practices, which may perpetuate a system in which 
defendants are subject to disparate disclosure polices based solely on where they are 
charged); see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 35, 57 (1987) (asserting that 35 of 350 
wrongful convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression of evidence); James S. 
Liebman et al., Capital Attrition:  Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1839, 1850 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial suppression of evidence accounted for 16 to 19 
percent of reversible errors). But see Eliason, supra note 9, at 19–20 (commenting that given 
the number of prosecutors in the country (over 35,000) and the number of criminal cases 
prosecuted each year (70,000 in federal courts) the incidences of prosecutorial misconduct 
are extremely small). 
 19. See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons:  The Role of Law Schools in Addressing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 396, 412 (2011) (discussing law 
schools’ “unique opportunity to reach tomorrow’s prosecutors and defense attorneys” by 
playing the “critical role” of addressing prosecutorial disclosure misconduct before it 
happens). 
 20. David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Department Prosecutors:  Guidance for 
Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors. 
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and local rules and practices.”21  DOJ implemented this policy specifically 
because it found that discovery “practices varied greatly in each district, 
influenced in large part by differing judicial expectations.”22  Different 
federal appellate jurisdictions adhere to different definitions of Brady 
material based on the information’s admissibility.23  DOJ’s policy not to 
pursue uniformity may therefore “unfortunately perpetuate a system of 
criminal justice where a defendant’s right to defend himself will largely 
depend on the federal district that brings the charge.”24 
This Note addresses the current circuit split over whether inadmissible 
evidence may nonetheless be material under Brady.  Part I examines the 
Brady rule and the role of the prosecutor, as well as the Supreme Court 
decision exacerbating the conflict.  Part II then outlines this conflict, 
comprised of three interpretations of how admissibility informs materiality.  
In Part III, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve the 
split by ruling that admissibility is a factor of materiality, but this Note 
ultimately argues that disclosure reform must come from within the 
prosecutor’s office. 
I.   THE BRADY DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
This Note seeks to resolve a current split of authority over whether 
evidence inadmissible at trial can nonetheless be material for Brady rule 
purposes.25  The conflict lies at the intersection of trial practice and the 
constitutionally rooted Brady doctrine.  Outlining both the Brady doctrine 
and the prosecutor’s role is necessary to understand how best to address the 
conflict.26  Part I.A of this Note discusses the Brady rule by outlining the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brady v. Maryland, as well as its predecessor 
and progeny jurisprudence.  Part I.B then addresses the prosecutor’s role by 
identifying the prosecution team, outlining the prosecutor’s responsibilities, 
and exploring the non-doctrinal sources governing the duty to disclose.  
Part I.C then concludes by introducing Wood v. Bartholomew, the Supreme 
Court holding exacerbating the circuit split on when inadmissible evidence 
is nonetheless material for Brady purposes. 
 
 
 21. David W. Ogden, Memorandum for Heads of Department Litigating Components 
Handling Criminal Matters:  Requirement for Office Discovery Policies in Criminal Matters 
(Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-heads-department-
litigating-components-handling-criminal-matters-all-united-states. 
 22. Bornstein et al., supra note 18, at 3. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. Bornstein et al., supra note 18, at 1. 
 25. This Note subsequently refers to “Brady rule purposes” as simply “Brady purposes.” 
 26. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
1321, 1321 (2011) (noting that “[p]rosecutorial disclosure of information to the defense has 
long been recognized as essential to a fair criminal justice system and yet, the required 
disclosure is ill defined and the subject of ongoing contention”). 
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A.   The Brady Rule 
The Brady rule states that a criminal prosecutor has a duty to uphold the 
defendant’s due process rights by disclosing any evidence material to guilt 
or punishment, or that could be used for impeachment.27  This doctrine was 
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, but it is rooted 
in predecessor cases and refined in progeny opinions.28  This section tracks 
the development of the Brady rule.  Part I.A.1 outlines the cases leading up 
to Brady v. Maryland.  Part I.A.2 discusses the Brady holding itself.  Part 
I.A.3 addresses the cases refining Brady and defining “materiality.” 
1.   Laying the Foundation:  The Predecessor Cases 
Until its holding in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court had never 
explicitly found that the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to a criminal defendant could be grounds for a new trial.29 
The Court first addressed the parameters of prosecutorial disclosure in 
Mooney v. Holohan.30  There, the petitioner contended that the prosecution 
violated his due process rights by obtaining a conviction after deliberately 
using perjured testimony and suppressing evidence impeaching that 
testimony.31  The Court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that due 
process rights are violated only when the suppression deprives him of 
notice and hearing, or prevents him from presenting his own evidence.32  
Importantly, this case marked the beginning of the Court’s effort to define 
the outer boundaries of the prosecutor’s duty, signaling that it construes the 
duty to actively “safeguard[] the liberty of the citizen against deprivation 
through the action of the State,” rather than requiring mere notice and 
hearing.33  The Court further avoided defining the prosecutor’s duty by 
stating that it was “unable to approve [the Attorney General’s] narrow view 
of the requirement of due process.”34  However, the Court nonetheless laid 
the groundwork for a broader construction of the prosecutor’s role as due 
process protector. 
Eight years later, the Court began to fill in the broad parameters of 
prosecutorial duty that it had sketched out in Mooney.35  In Pyle v. 
 
 
 27. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 676 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 28. See infra Part I.A.1, 3. 
 29. See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction?  The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 469 (2001). 
 30. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
 31. See id. at 110. 
 32. See id. at 112. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (noting that “[i]n Pyle v. 
Kansas . . . we phrased the rule [of Mooney v. Holohan] in broader terms”). 
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Kansas,36 the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten to 
twenty-one years for murder and robbery.37  The Court held that his due 
process rights were violated because the prosecutor knowingly relied on 
perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed other favorable testimony.38  
In finding that these acts would constitute “a deprivation of rights 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution,”39 Pyle marked a shift in the 
Court’s interpretation of the prosecutor’s duty from defining what the limits 
were not to what they affirmatively include. 
In Napue v. Illinois,40 the Court further developed its prosecutorial 
disclosure doctrine by applying the Mooney standard to overturn a murder 
conviction.41  In Napue, the petitioner was sentenced to 199 years in prison 
for fatally shooting an off-duty policeman in a bar.42  At trial, the 
prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of a man who was part of the 
shooting and had himself been convicted for the officer’s murder and 
sentenced to 199 years in prison.43  Although the prosecutor had promised 
the witness a sentencing reduction recommendation in exchange for his 
testimony against the petitioner, the witness testified at trial that he had not 
received any consideration in exchange for his testimony.44 
The petitioner argued that the prosecution violated his due process rights 
when it failed to correct this false testimony.45  The Court agreed, holding 
that the prosecutor’s failure to correct the false testimony constituted a due 
process violation because it may have altered the trial’s outcome.46  The 
Court’s holding in Napue maintained its concern with intentional 
prosecutorial misconduct in Mooney and further expanded the prosecutor’s 
responsibility to not merely refrain from knowingly using false testimony 
but rather to proactively correct false testimony when necessary.47 
 
 
 36. 317 U.S. 213 (1942). 
 37. See id. at 214. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 216. 
 40. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
 41. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (noting that “[i]n Napue v. Illinois, 
we extended the test formulated in Mooney v. Holohan” (citation omitted)). 
 42. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 265. 
 43. See id. at 265–66. 
 44. See id. at 265. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 272. 
 47. See id. at 269. The Court asserted:  
First, it is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, 
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .  The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting 
false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.  
Id. (citing Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 (1957) (emphasis omitted).  Although the 
Court’s criminal prosecutorial disclosure doctrine remained focused on curtailing intentional 
misconduct, it expanded with Brady to put “such subtle factors as the possible interest of the 
witness in testifying falsely” within the prosecutor’s purview to actively remedy it if 
required. Id. 
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2.   Brady v. Maryland 
In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose, which would subsequently be developed into 
the Brady rule.48  The Brady holding can be seen as a natural extension of 
the Court’s prior rulings on a criminal defendant’s rights.49  Alternatively, it 
can be understood as a significant departure.  Whereas the Court’s pre-
Brady focus was on intentional prosecutorial misconduct, Brady created a 
prophylactic protection of the defendant’s due process rights.50 
In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”51  This holding 
reflects a shift away from the narrow focus of the prosecutor’s conduct, as 
emphasized in the Mooney line of cases, to the defendant’s rights.52 
At twenty-five years old, John Brady was unemployed and expecting a 
baby with his still-married girlfriend.53  Concerned with providing for his 
burgeoning family, Brady planned to rob a bank with his girlfriend’s 
brother, Donald Boblit.54  Needing a car, Brady and Boblit agreed to steal 
an acquaintance’s new Ford.55  The two men waited together near the 
acquaintance’s driveway, tricked him into exiting his car, struck him 
unconscious with a blow to the head, and took him to a secluded field 
where they strangled him to death and carried the corpse into the woods.56 
Afterwards, Brady made a series of inconsistent statements to the 
police.57  He admitted to almost every aspect of those statements at trial but 
 
 
 48. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 49. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (“This ruling is an extension of 
Mooney v. Holohan . . . .”); Adam M. Harris, Note, Two Constitutional Wrongs Do Not 
Make a Right:  Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct Under the Brady Doctrine, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 931, 934 (2006) (asserting that the Brady holding “was an extension of 
an earlier Supreme Court case”). 
 50. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
686 (2006) (noting that “by explicitly commanding prosecutors to disclose to defendants 
facing a criminal trial any favorable evidence that is material to their guilt or punishment, 
Brady launched the modern development of constitutional disclosure requirements”); 
Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 416 
(2011) (noting that “the Court’s post-Brady jurisprudence expanded the Brady doctrine 
beyond its original holding by applying it to new contexts and different types of evidence”). 
 51. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 52. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland:  From Adversarial Gamesmanship 
Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129 (Carol S. Steiker 
ed., 2006) (“Brady’s test turns not on whether the prosecutor misled a jury or acted in good 
faith, but on whether the evidence is favorable and material to guilt or punishment.  Thus, 
Brady marked a potentially revolutionary shift from traditionally unfettered adversarial 
combat toward a more inquisitorial, innocence-focused system.”). 
 53. See id. at 132. 
 54. See id. at 132–33. 
 55. See id. at 133. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
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denied that he was the actual killer.58  Boblit admitted to taking part in the 
robbery and killing in a series of statements to the police.59  In his fifth 
statement, however, Boblit admitted that it was he, not Brady, who had 
actually struck the man unconscious and strangled him to death.60 
Both Brady and Boblit were charged with murder.61  Before trial, 
Brady’s attorney requested that the prosecution share any of Brady or 
Boblit’s extrajudicial statements.62  The prosecution shared several of 
Boblit’s statements but withheld the fifth statement in which he admitted to 
having been the killer.63  Brady would not learn of this exculpatory 
statement until after he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced 
to death.64 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals finding that 
suppression of Boblit’s confession constituted a violation of Brady’s due 
process rights.65  Extending and expanding the rule as crafted in Mooney, 
Pyle, and Napue,66 the Court held that the prosecution’s suppression of 
evidence favorable to the defendant and material to his guilt or 
punishment—notwithstanding good intentions—violated the defendant’s 
due process rights.67  Emphasizing that “[s]ociety wins not only when the 
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair,” the Court noted that 
the prosecutor’s duty is to “comport with standards of justice” rather than 
simply to secure a conviction.68  The Court reasoned that any evidence that 
would “tend to exculpate” the defendant shapes the outcome of a trial, and 
is thus a factor of attaining such standards of justice.69 
3.   Post-Brady Jurisprudence and Defining “Material” 
Brady v. Maryland is a landmark holding in part because it departed from 
predecessor doctrine to expand the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure.70  
Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas did not, however, 
 
 
 58. See Brady v. State, 160 A.2d 912, 913 (Md. 1960), rev’d and remanded, 174 A.2d 
167 (Md. 1961), aff’d, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 59. See Bibas, supra note 52, at 133. 
 60. See RICHARD HAMMER, BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH:  A SHATTERING ACCOUNT OF A 
MAN’S NINE YEARS IN THE HORRIFYING LIMBO OF DEATH ROW 114–15 (1969). 
 61. See Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434 (Md. 1959). 
 62. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id.; see also Bibas, supra note 52, at 134 (noting that Brady’s appellate attorney 
discovered Boblit’s confession statement by reviewing the trial transcripts). 
 65. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 66. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 67. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–88. 
 68. Id. at 87–88. See also infra Part I.B for further discussion of the prosecutor’s role. 
 69. Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. 
 70. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 686 n.7 (noting that “Brady built its holding 
principally on several earlier Supreme Court and circuit court decisions dealing with the 
prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony, and in a few cases with the prosecutor’s suppression 
of exculpatory evidence”). 
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define the terms on which the Brady rule, as articulated, would turn.71  A 
line of Supreme Court cases from 1972 to 1995 refines pivotal aspects of 
the Brady holding.72  Most significant to this Note’s analysis is the Court’s 
definition of “material” evidence.73 
In Giglio v. United States74 the Court established that evidence that could 
be used to impeach a witness was “material” for Brady rule purposes.75  
There, the Court found that suppressing evidence that could undercut a 
witness’s credibility is a due process violation where the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence may rest on that witness’s reliability.76  The Court thus 
established two types of evidence that may be “material” and so subject to 
disclosure:  exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence.77 
In 1976 the Court began to define the contours of “materiality.”  In 
United States v. Agurs78 the Court defined material evidence in three ways.  
First, evidence can be material even if the defendant does not request its 
disclosure and rather should be proactively shared by the prosecution 
regardless of any request from the defendant.79  Second, evidence is 
material for Brady purposes if it creates a reasonable doubt that did not 
otherwise exist.80  The Court would continue to explain this in future 
cases.81  Lastly, the Court found that materiality turns on the defendant’s 
 
 
 71. See infra Part II. 
 72. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 689–90.  Gershman notes that “the [Brady] ‘rule’ 
has undergone considerable judicial alteration over the years,” but the 
most far-reaching modification of Brady has been the judiciary’s interpretation of 
the concept of “materiality” . . . .  Whereas Brady used the term “materiality” 
prospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor is required to disclose to a 
defendant to protect his right to a fair trial, the judiciary’s current approach defines 
materiality retrospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor should have 
disclosed to the defendant, and whether the prosecutor’s nondisclosure was so 
prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial. 
Id. 
 73. See infra Part II.  Although the Court’s holding in Brady v. Maryland defined the 
duty to disclose with several factors (i.e., “suppression,” “favorable to an accused,” “material 
either to guilt or to punishment,” and “irrespective of the good or bad faith”), this Note 
focuses on the “materiality” factor alone. See 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  The various 
interpretations of “material” have garnered significant interest from courts and 
commentators. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 689 (noting that “courts and commentators 
consistently have recognized, the most far-reaching modification of Brady has been the 
judiciary’s interpretation of the concept of ‘materiality’”). 
 74. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 75. See id. at 154–55. 
 76. See id. at 154.  Although the Court broadly held that evidence that may be used to 
impeach a witness must be disclosed, some nonetheless interpret Giglio narrowly to limit the 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligation to only agreements made with key witnesses. See Peter A. 
Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Implicit Plea Agreements and Brady Disclosure, 22 CRIM. JUST. 
50, 50 (2007). 
 77. See Douglass, supra note 29, at 496. 
 78. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 79. See id. at 110. 
 80. See id. at 112–13. 
 81. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
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ability to prepare for trial82 due to an “overriding concern with the justice of 
the finding of guilt.”83 
The Court in Agurs further articulated the situations in which 
nondisclosure of information may be a due process violation requiring a 
reversal.84  The first is when the prosecution knowingly uses false or 
perjured testimony that has a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury’s 
judgment.85  Reversal may also be warranted when the prosecution does not 
share information the defendant specifically requested, and its disclosure 
may have affected the trial outcome.86  Similarly, the prosecution is 
required to volunteer potentially exculpatory information and must share it 
after the defense’s general request, or reversal may be warranted where its 
suppression creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.87 
Fifteen years later in United States v. Bagley,88 the Court further fleshed 
out a materiality standard by holding that evidence is material for Brady 
purposes if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”89  Invoking its own definition of “reasonable probability” in 
Strickland v. Washington,90 which addressed defense counsel’s conduct 
rather than prosecution practices, the Court in Bagley defined reasonable 
probability as one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome [of 
the trial].”91 
The Court went on to further refine the “reasonable probability” standard 
in Kyles v. Whitley.92  There, the Court specified that, although evidence is 
“material” for Brady purposes, if there is a reasonable probability that its 
disclosure would have altered the trial outcome, such an alternative 
outcome need not be an acquittal.93  The Court explained that “[a]lthough 
the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact of favorable but 
undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not require 
demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed 
evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.”94  
The Court further clarified that the materiality standard is not a “sufficiency 
 
 
 82. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 n.20. 
 83. Id. at 112. 
 84. See id. at 103–04. 
 85. See id. at 103. 
 86. See id. at 104. 
 87. See id. at 112–13. 
 88. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 89. Id. at 682. 
 90. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 91. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also Serota, supra note 50, at 416 (interpreting the 
Court’s “reasonable probability” standard to “constru[e] the doctrine’s materiality 
requirement quite narrowly”). 
 92. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 93. See id. at 434. 
 94. Id. 
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of evidence test”95 because the defendant demonstrates a Brady violation by 
showing that the favorable evidence, not on its own but in the context of the 
entire case, could “put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.”96 
B.   Prosecution in Practice 
Understanding the role of the prosecutor is critical to this Note’s analysis 
of the prosecutor’s potential duty to disclose inadmissible material 
evidence.  The prosecutor’s role is complex as both an investigator and 
advocate97 and is informed by a similarly complex group of authoritative 
sources.98  This section first identifies “the prosecution,” then discusses the 
prosecutor’s unique adversarial role, and concludes by outlining the 
practical rules and standards that converge to guide the prosecutor’s duty to 
disclose. 
1.   Identifying the Prosecution:  Who Is the “Prosecution Team”? 
A prosecutor is the legal officer representing the state or federal 
government in critical proceedings.99  The definition of the prosecution as it 
relates to the duty to disclose Brady material, however, has effectively 
expanded beyond the individual attorney representing the government.100  
The Supreme Court has held that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”101  Therefore, if “the 
prosecution” is defined by its access to Brady material and its responsibility 
to the defendant, then it includes not just the government attorney but also 
law enforcement acting on the case.102  The convergence of the prosecutor 
 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 434–35. 
 97. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards 
for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1119–20 (2011) (noting 
that the proposed revisions to the ABA’s Prosecutorial Function Standards will define “who 
a ‘prosecutor’ is, add[] the concept of ‘problem solver’ to that definition, discuss[] who the 
prosecutor’s ‘client’ is, . . . [and address] [t]he concept of attorneys acting within an 
organizational structure . . . most significantly within the organization of a prosecutor’s 
office”). 
 98. See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTORIAL 
INVESTIGATIONS, pmbl. (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standar
ds_pinvestigate.html (noting that “[a] prosecutor’s investigative role, responsibilities and 
potential liability are different from the prosecutor’s role and responsibilities as a courtroom 
advocate.”). 
 99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (10th ed. 2014). 
 100. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See.e.g., Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s Duty to Search the 
Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1480–92 (2003) 
(outlining the Court’s jurisprudence on the prosecutor’s duty to search government agencies 
for Brady material). 
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and law enforcement agents to create “the prosecution team” has roots in 
England103 and continues today.104 
DOJ itself acknowledges that the prosecutor is but one member of a 
larger “prosecution team.”105  Identifying who is a member of the 
prosecution team is crucial to Brady disclosure practices because 
government attorneys must review and disclose to the defense any favorable 
material held by any member of the prosecution team.106  Determining 
which agencies and individuals are on the prosecution team can, however, 
require clarification.107 
The prosecution team can be comprised of “federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers and other government officials participating in the 
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant.”108  
Moreover, the definition of the prosecution team can be “adjusted to fit the 
circumstances” of multidistrict investigations or parallel criminal and civil 
proceedings involving various federal agencies.109  When the investigation 
involves a state law enforcement agency, DOJ advises its prosecutors to 
“make sure they understand the law in their circuit and their offices’ 
practice regarding discovery.”110  Because identifying members of the 
prosecution team can be inexact, DOJ encourages its attorneys to “err on 
the side of inclusiveness.”111 
The prosecutor herself remains, nonetheless, distinct from the 
prosecution team in a way significant to this Note’s analysis of the nexus of 
admissibility and materiality.  It is the prosecutor’s responsibility to “learn 
of” exculpatory or impeachment information held by other members of the 
prosecution team.112  This passive language (“learn of”) adopted by the 
Court is augmented by the active language of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, 
stating that the prosecutor is obligated to “seek all exculpatory and 
 
 
 103. See Bibas, supra note 52, at 131 (drawing from JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF 
ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003) to discuss the foundations of our American adversarial 
criminal system, the author states:  “By the late eighteenth century [in England], lawyers had 
taken over the criminal process. . . .  Prosecutors came to see police officers almost as their 
clients and worked closely with them to dig up evidence and witnesses and prepare 
witnesses’ testimony for trial. . . .  The American colonies inherited this adversarial criminal 
process from England”). 
 104. See generally Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003). 
 105. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-5.001(B)(2). 
 106. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995). 
 107. See, e.g., PUB. DEFENDER SERVICE FOR D.C., BRADY V. MARYLAND OUTLINE 21–22 
(Jan. 2012), available at http://www.pdsdc.org/Resources/SLD/BradyOutline 
FINAL2012.pdf (clarifying to public defenders that the prosecution’s responsibilities as they 
relate to Brady extend to an “entire ‘Prosecution Team’”). 
 108. Ogden, supra note 20. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that the prosecution has a duty 
to disclose any evidence favorable to the defendant “known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf . . . including the police”). 
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impeachment information from all the members of the prosecution 
team.”113  The prosecutor is thus charged with making herself aware of 
potentially exculpatory information that other members of the prosecution 
team may possess. 
The prosecutor is responsible for disclosing exculpatory information to 
the defense even when the law enforcement investigators do not make her 
aware of its existence.114  This responsibility is imputed on the prosecutor 
because she alone is responsible for reviewing evidence for materiality.115  
As the “architect of a proceeding,”116 the prosecutor has the power to 
establish case management procedures that promote communication 
between the law enforcement investigators and government lawyers.117 
2.   The Prosecution’s Role:  
Safeguarding Justice While Securing Convictions 
This section identifies what the prosecution is expected to accomplish in 
a criminal proceeding.  There is an inherent tension in the prosecutor’s role 
as both an adversarial advocate and protector of the defendant’s due process 
rights.118  Indeed, DOJ is mindful to define a prosecutor’s success in terms 
of justice and not convictions alone.119  The prosecutor is charged with 
pursuing both a conviction and justice, but never the former at the expense 
of the latter.120  The tension between attaining convictions while pursuing 
 
 
 113. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-5.001(B)(2) (emphasis added). 
 114. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 420. 
 115. See id. at 437 (“[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must 
be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence 
and make disclosure when the point of ‘reasonable probability’ [of undermining confidence 
in the verdict] is reached.”); see also supra Part I.A. 
 116. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). 
 117. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“[P]rocedures and regulations 
can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all 
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.”). 
 118. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable 
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
93, 100 (2004) (“Woven throughout each of the major Supreme Court decisions construing 
Brady has been the theme that responsibility for ensuring the accused receives a fair trial 
rests not with the judge, jury, defense counsel, police, or some combination thereof, but with 
the prosecutor.”); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (noting that justice is not achieved merely 
when criminals are convicted; rather, “our system of the administration of justice suffers 
when any accused is treated unfairly”). 
 119. See Mission Statement, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014) (“To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according 
to the law . . . to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure 
fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.”). 
 120. Id.  Although DOJ emphasizes the pursuit of justice over mere convictions, 
prosecutors may feel pressured to maintain a conviction success rate to retain respect and to 
advance in their profession. Compare Ogden, supra note 20 (advising prosecutors on 
discovery guidelines to “avoid lapses that can result in consequences adverse to the 
Department’s pursuit of justice”), with Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 108 
(1991) (“Prosecutors who restrain themselves may convict at a lower rate and thus appear 
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justice is inherent in the prosecutor’s role121 and reflected in Brady v. 
Maryland itself122 where Justice William O. Douglas emphasized the 
prosecutor’s dual responsibility as a public servant to promote the rule of 
law and to seek justice simultaneously.123 
3.   Disclosure in Practice:  The Several Sources 
The prosecutor’s duty of disclosure is the product of a constitutional 
minimum standard set by Brady and its progeny124 and augmented125 by 
nonjudicial sources.126  These sources include the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as its 
Criminal Justice Standards, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.127  This section examines how these sources 
overlap to define the prosecutor’s disclosure duty in practice. 
The prosecutor’s disclosure duty is rooted in the Brady rule but is also 
informed by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.128  The ABA 
is a voluntary association of attorneys that aims to improve the profession 
by, among other things, eliminating bias.129  The ABA drafts the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct as “rules of reason”130 because the “legal 
profession is largely self-governing [and] is unique in this respect because 
 
 
less competent to their superiors.”), and Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:  
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 851, 900 (1995) (noting the role that a favorable trial record and securing 
convictions play in earning the respect and admiration of others in one’s office). 
 121. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that the prosecutor “is 
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose 
interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done”). 
 122. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (emphasizing that the prosecutor 
should not be the “architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of 
justice”). 
 123. See id. at 87 n.2 (“We are constantly reminded of the now classic words penned by 
one of my illustrious predecessors, Frederick William Lehmann, that the Government wins 
its point when justice is done in its courts.”); see also Little, supra note 97, at 1118 (noting 
that the ABA Ethics Committee proposed that the Fourth Edition of the Criminal Justice 
Standards include a standard titled “The Client of the Prosecutor”). 
 124. See supra Part I.A. 
 125. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (noting that the disclosure duty 
“may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations” than under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by Brady); Curry v. United States, 658 A.2d 193, 197 
(D.C. 1995) (noting that the Court’s holding in Brady “is not a discovery rule but a rule of 
fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation” (quoting United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 
626, 630 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979))). 
 126. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 26 at 1326–27. 
 127. See id. at 1326. 
 128. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 687 (noting that “more explicitly than any other 
constitutional procedural guarantee, Brady’s due process standard has been incorporated into 
an explicit ethical duty upon government attorneys”). 
 129. See About the American Bar Association, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org 
/about_the_aba.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT:  SCOPE (1983). 
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of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of 
government and law enforcement.”131  Violation of the Model Rules does 
not itself give rise to a cause of action against the attorney but is the basis 
for invoking the professional disciplinary process.132  Every state except 
California has adopted a Code of Professional Conduct modeled on the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.133  Federal prosecutors are bound to 
their respective state code of conduct by virtue of 28 C.F.R. § 77.3.134 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) (“Special Responsibilities of 
a Prosecutor”) is particularly relevant to this Note’s discussion of whether 
the duty to disclose extends to inadmissible evidence.  Model Rule 3.8(d) 
requires the prosecutor in a criminal case to “make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,” in addition to any 
mitigating information relevant to the sentencing phase of trial.135 
The ABA’s Ethics Committee interprets Model Rule 3.8(d) to be more 
expansive in scope than constitutionally mandated disclosure obligations.136  
Most significant to this Note’s discussion of the relationship between 
 
 
 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT:  PREAMBLE:  A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 132. See id.  See generally Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant 
Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar:  Three Case Studies that Prove 
that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2011). 
 133. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2014). 
 134. 28 C.F.R. § 77.3 (2014) (“[A]ttorneys for the government shall conform their 
conduct and activities to the state rules and laws, and federal local courts rules, governing 
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties.”). 
 135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d). 
 136. See Bruce Green, Report to the House of Delegates, 2011 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 
REP. 9, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_ 
justice/2011a_resolution_105d.authcheckdam.pdf (“Rule 3.8(d) demands more than the 
constitutional case law . . . .”).  A prosecutor could, therefore, satisfy her disclosure 
obligation legally while failing to satisfy it ethically.  “The standard established by Rule 
3.8(d) is ‘only’ an ethical requirement, not a rule that trial judges enforce.” Id. at 10.  The 
Model Rules therefore perhaps lack the teeth needed to accomplish its intended “narrow 
disciplinary” purpose of deterring prosecutorial misconduct by imposing a disclosure 
requirement that is more broad than the constitutional requirement. Id. See generally 
Gershman, supra note 50, at 691 (noting that “apart from legal accountability, prosecutors 
are almost never disciplined by the legal profession for Brady violations, even in the most 
blatant and easily provable cases”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against 
Prosecutors for Brady Violations:  A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Editorial, 
Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at SR10 (“According to the 
Center for Prosecutor Integrity, multiple studies over the past 50 years show that courts 
punished prosecutorial misconduct in less than 2 percent of cases where it occurred.  And 
that rarely amounted to more than a slap on the wrist, such as making the prosecutor pay for 
the cost of the disciplinary hearing.”).  But see Little, supra note 97, at 1113 (noting that 
“[w]hile the [Criminal Justice] Standards [discussed infra] have no force of law unless 
adopted by a court or legislature, their process of development has successfully yielded 
standards that fairly reflect widely shared professional views”). 
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admissibility and materiality is the ABA’s finding that evidence favorable 
to the defense should be disclosed regardless of its materiality.137  Rule 
3.8(d) requires the disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused 
regardless of its anticipated impact on the trial outcome.138  The 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to disclose is therefore not limited to admissible 
evidence and instead extends to any favorable information.139 
The ABA sets out further disclosure duty guidelines140 in the Standards 
for Criminal Justice:  Prosecution and Defense Function.141  Standard 3-
3.11 (“Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor”) suggests that142 the 
prosecutor not “intentionally fail” to disclose to the defense at the earliest 
opportunity any Brady material, and not to “intentionally avoid pursuit” of 
evidence because she believes it will damage her case.143  Proposed 
revisions to the Prosecution Function Standards144 include ten new 
standards addressing issues such as a “heightened duty of candor” and the 
“preservation of evidence.”145  The proposed fourth edition of the Standards 
reflects an understanding that the prosecutor’s function and duty of 
disclosure are sufficiently complex to warrant “greater specificity.”146 
In addition to the professional guidelines drafted by the ABA, the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory material evidence is informed by 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.147  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
 
 
 137. See Green, supra note 136, at 9–10. 
 138. See id. at 9. 
 139. See id. at 9–10. 
 140. See ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3–1.1 (1993) 
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS] (noting that the Criminal Justice Standards are 
“intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance”); see also Little, 
supra note 97, at 1117 (noting that “the ABA does not intend or envision its Standards to be 
used as ‘clubs’ to batter lawyers who, for various and often reasonable reasons, may act 
differently than a Standard may propose”). 
 141. See generally Little, supra note 97 (outlining the development of the Standards and 
the process adopted by the task force charged with spearheading revisions). 
 142. See id. at 1117 (noting that “the Standards never use the word ‘must’ but instead 
consistently state that lawyers ‘should’ do x or y”). 
 143. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 140, § 3–3.11 (“(a) A prosecutor should 
not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible 
opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of 
the accused.  (b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply 
with a legally proper discovery request.  (c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid 
pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid 
the accused.”). 
 144. See Little, supra note 97, at 1114–15 (noting that the Standards Committee task 
force began the Prosecution Function Standards revision process in 2010, but that the final 
adoption of a fourth edition of the Standards was not expected to occur until at least 2013.)  
However, as of November 2014, the fourth edition has not yet been adopted. See CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 140, 
 145. Little, supra note 97, at 1118. 
 146. Yaroshefsky, supra note 26, at 1327. 
 147. See id. at 1325 (“Federal and state court rules and statutes supplement prosecutors’ 
constitutional obligations.”). 
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Procedure govern all criminal proceedings in federal court.148  Most 
relevant to this Note’s discussion of how admissibility informs materiality 
is Rule 16 (“Discovery and Inspection”).  Rule 16 requires the prosecutor to 
disclose upon the defendant’s request information material to preparing the 
defense.149  Such information may include the defendant’s statement, his 
prior criminal record, tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, 
and an expert witness’s forthcoming testimony.150 
Unlike the Brady rule, Rule 16 does not require disclosure of information 
“material to punishment.”151  Therefore, although the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure might be considered an attempted codification of the 
Brady rule,152 Rule 16 does not fully address the prosecutor’s disclosure 
duty.153  Because the prosecution “control[s] the flow of information to the 
defendant,”154 this limited disclosure scope imposes a challenge on the 
defendant’s preparation. 
The American College of Trial Lawyers has, in response, proposed 
amending Rule 16 to “ensure that defendants receive the full and 
consistently applied benefit” of the Brady rule and to “promote greater 
fairness and integrity in criminal discovery generally.”155  Amendments 
would define “favorable information,” require the prosecution to respond to 
disclosure requests in writing within fourteen days, and impose a due 
diligence obligation on the prosecution to consult with government agents 
for disclosable information.156  Such revisions are intended to ensure a 
more fair trial by clearly defining how the prosecutor can identify 
exculpatory information warranting disclosure.157 
In addition to constitutional standards, codes of professional conduct and 
federal rules, the prosecutor’s disclosure duty is informed by guidelines 
drafted by the prosecutor’s office.158  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is 
 
 
 148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a)(1) (“These rules govern the procedure in all criminal 
proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States courts of appeals, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”). 
 149. See id. 16. 
 150. See id.; see also The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2013) (further providing that a 
prosecutor may be compelled to produce a verbatim statement of a government witness after 
the witness has testified). 
 151. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461–64 (1996); Yaroshefsky, supra 
note 26, at 1325 n.16. 
 152. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 725 (“Codifying Brady”). 
 153. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 118, at 94 (“Four decades later [after 
Brady v. Maryland], Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, which govern federal 
plea negotiations and criminal discovery, respectively, still do not address this duty, let alone 
require the government to timely disclose to the defendant favorable information that is 
material to either guilt or sentencing.”). 
 154. Id. at 102. 
 155. Id. at 95. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 101. 
 158. See Gershman, supra note 50, at 686–87 (noting that “prosecutors’ offices have 
formulated guidelines to foster compliance with the requirements of Brady”). 
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drafted by DOJ to serve as a “quick and ready”159 (yet “comprehensive”160) 
reference for federal prosecutors.  Section 9-5.001 addresses the USAO 
policy on disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information in a 
criminal trial or court proceeding.161 
Most relevant to the circuit court split at issue in this Note is the 
Manual’s discussion of “Materiality and Admissibility.”162  The USAO 
recognizes that “it is sometimes difficult to assess” evidence for disclosure-
warranting materiality.163  In response, the USAO highlights its policy of 
encouraging prosecutors to “err on the side of disclosure if admissibility is a 
close question.”164  The federal prosecutor’s office therefore promotes a 
view of materiality that is more broad than that required by the Court.165 
C.   Exacerbating the Conflict:  Wood v. Bartholomew 
In 1995, the Supreme Court was faced with an issue that Brady and its 
progeny had not addressed:  whether inadmissible evidence is per se 
immaterial for Brady purposes.166 In Wood v. Bartholomew, the Court 
found that an inadmissible polygraph result was immaterial for Brady 
purposes.167  The Court did not, however, explain whether inadmissibility 
was determinative of, or simply a factor of, materiality.168  The circuit 
courts have subsequently produced three different interpretations of Wood, 
resulting in the current conflict over whether inadmissible evidence may, 
nonetheless, be material.169 
On August 1, 1981, Dwayne Bartholomew killed a laundromat attendant 
by shooting him in the head during a robbery.170  Because Bartholomew 
admitted that he committed the robbery and that the shots came from his 
gun,171 the issue at trial was only whether Bartholomew was guilty of 
aggravated first-degree murder requiring proof of premeditation or first-
degree murder not requiring premeditation.172 
 
 
 159. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 1-1.100 (2009) . 
 160. Id. § 1-1.200. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. § 9-5.001(B)(1). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 9-5.001(E). 
 165. See id. § 9-5.001(B)(1).  That the USAO encourages prosecutors to err on the side of 
disclosure begs the question of why the conflict at issue in this Note exists.  Perhaps the 
answer can be found by noticing the USAO’s potentially overlapping—if not actually 
conflicting—messages:  whereas the Manual promotes a broad view of materiality as it 
relates to admissibility, the Ogden Memo encouraged prosecutors to follow the local 
disclosure practice. 
 166. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See infra Part II. 
 170. Wood, 516 U.S. at 2. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 3. 
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The defendant and witnesses alleged contrasting versions of the facts.  
Bartholomew’s brother and the brother’s girlfriend testified that 
Bartholomew told them he planned to rob the laundromat and to “leave no 
witnesses.”173  The defendant denied saying this and instead testified that 
his gun discharged by accident—once into the attendant’s head and a 
second time into the nearby counter.174  The defendant further contended 
that his brother had in fact assisted in the robbery by convincing the 
attendant to open the already locked laundromat doors.175 
Before trial, the brother took a polygraph test in which he was asked if he 
and Bartholomew were in the laundromat together during the robbery and if 
he had assisted Bartholomew in the robbery.176  The brother responded in 
the negative to both questions, but the polygraph examiner concluded that 
his responses indicated deception.177  Neither the brother’s polygraph 
examination results nor those of his girlfriend were disclosed to 
Bartholomew.178 
Bartholomew filed a habeas petition in the Western District of 
Washington arguing that the prosecution’s failure to produce the polygraph 
examinations constituted a Brady violation.179  The district court denied the 
writ, holding that Bartholomew failed to “show that evidence was withheld” 
because he “fail[ed] to show that disclosure of the results of the polygraph 
to defense counsel would have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the 
verdict.”180 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, 
instead holding that the polygraph information was material under Brady 
despite being inadmissible at trial under Washington law.181  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the lower court’s assumption that “the polygraph results 
would have been material if they had been admissible.”182  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the polygraph results were 
inadmissible, their disclosure could have prompted the defense counsel to 
investigate the brother’s story and to depose him, which might have 
“uncovered a variety of conflicting statements which could have been used 
quite effectively in cross-examination at trial [of the brother].”183 
The Supreme Court granted Bartholomew’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, instead finding the 
polygraph results immaterial.184  The Court emphasized its previous 
 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. at 3–4. 
 176. See id. at 4. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 4–5. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. See Bartholomew v. Wood, 34 F.3d 870, 876 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 182. Id. at 875. 
 183. Id. at 875–76. 
 184. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 9. 
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holdings in Kyles and Bagley that evidence is material under Brady only 
when there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have led to a 
different outcome at trial.185  Here, the polygraph results were not 
reasonably likely to alter the trial result because they were inadmissible 
under state law.186 
Significant to this Note’s focus on admissibility and materiality is the 
Court’s discussion in dicta of the Ninth Circuit’s finding.  The Court 
rejected the proposition that the polygraph results were material because 
their disclosure could have instigated a defense trial strategy change, which 
could have led to admissible evidence.187  That reasoning was criticized as 
too tenuous and speculative for having ignored that the defense counsel had 
not actually planned to depose the brother.188 
Although the Court noted that this logic was too speculative on the 
facts,189 it did not decide whether inadmissible evidence may be material if 
its disclosure could eventually lead to admissible evidence.190  The circuit 
courts have interpreted this fact-specific aspect of the Wood opinion 
differently, precipitating the current split of authority on whether 
inadmissible evidence can nonetheless be material.191 
 
 
 185. See id. at 5–6; see also supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 6. 
 187. See id. at 5–6.  The Court emphasized that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning could not be 
upheld in part because “the Court of Appeals did not specify what particular evidence it had 
in mind [and therefore] [i]ts judgment is based on mere speculation, in violation of the 
standards we have established.” Id.  It is unclear whether the Court would have found the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning more acceptable had the circuit court specified the type of 
evidence it thought the polygraph results could have led defense counsel to beyond “a 
variety of conflicting statements which could have been used quite effectively in cross-
examination at trial” to weaken the brother’s testimony. Wood, 34 F.3d at 876.  This mix of a 
clear holding with ambiguous asides in the reasoning is what makes the Court’s holding in 
Wood fodder for the circuit courts’ varying interpretations of whether inadmissible evidence 
can be material under Brady. 
 188. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 6–7. 
 189. See id. at 6, 8 (noting that “[the Ninth Circuit’s] judgment is based on mere 
speculation” because, even if the polygraph results were admissible at trial under state law, 
and even if defense counsel could have been inspired to change strategy to depose the 
brother, the jury would still not likely think Bartholomew’s gun went off twice by accident). 
 190. See Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Search for the Truth or a Game of Strategy?  The 
Circuit Split Over the Prosecution’s Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpatory 
Information to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 148 (2001) (noting that “the crux of 
the Court’s holding was that the undisclosed polygraph results were not material because 
there was not a reasonable probability that, had they been disclosed, the trial result would 
have been different, because the evidence against Bartholomew was overwhelming. . . .  [It 
thus] remains to be seen what the Court would do if it was [sic] squarely presented with the 
issue”). 
 191. See id. (positing that because the Court could have resolved Wood differently “[w]ith 
slightly varied facts,” the issue of whether inadmissible evidence can be material remains 
open to interpretation by the circuit courts). 
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II.   THE CONFLICT:  CAN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BE MATERIAL? 
Part II of this Note discusses the circuit split regarding whether evidence 
inadmissible at trial may nonetheless be material under Brady.  The split is 
comprised of three primary understandings of when the prosecutor must 
disclose inadmissible exculpatory information.  Part II.A discusses the 
courts interpreting Wood v. Bartholomew to create a rule that inadmissible 
evidence is per se immaterial.192  These “per se courts” consider 
admissibility determinative of materiality.  Part II.B then addresses the 
courts holding that inadmissible evidence may be material if its disclosure 
could yield admissible evidence.193  These “factor courts” consider 
admissibility a factor of materiality.194  Part II.B.1 outlines which of these 
courts require a direct link between the inadmissible and admissible 
evidence, while Part II.B.2 discusses the courts holding that the link must 
be based on more than “mere speculation.”195  Part II.C discusses the 
“Bagley courts”—those that do not consider admissibility a factor of 
materiality and instead interpret Wood as applying the Bagley and Kyles 
“reasonable probability of an altered trial outcome” materiality test.196 
A.   “Per Se Courts”:  Admissibility Is Determinative of Materiality 
The First and Fourth circuits interpret Wood as creating a per se rule that 
inadmissible evidence is immaterial for Brady purposes.197  These per se 
courts hold that the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence 
that would be inadmissible at trial does not constitute a violation of the 
defendant’s due process rights.198  Reasoning that information cannot create 
a reasonable probability of an altered trial outcome199 if it cannot be 
introduced as evidence, these courts find admissibility determinative of 
materiality. 
In United States v. Rosario-Diaz,200 the First Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s holding that there was no Brady violation where the prosecution 
failed to disclose a policeman’s statement about a witness’s testimony.201  
There, the codefendants were convicted of murdering a young woman after 
 
 
 192. See infra Part II.A. 
 193. See infra Part II.B. 
 194. See infra Part II.B. 
 195. United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1999); see also infra Part II.B. 
 196. See infra Part II.C. 
 197. See infra notes 200–19 and accompanying text. But see Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (Lipez, J., concurring) (noting that although a written note was 
inadmissible evidence as “double hearsay,” it may nonetheless be material if its disclosure 
could lead to admissible evidence).  The Ellsworth court noted, “we think it plain that 
evidence itself inadmissible could be so promising a lead to strong exculpatory evidence that 
there could be no justification for withholding it.  Wood v. Bartholomew . . . implicitly 
assumes this is so.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted) (en banc) (majority opinion). 
 198. See infra notes 200–19 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
 200. 202 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 201. See id. at 66–67. 
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carjacking her and demanding drug money that they thought she was 
holding as a fellow drug trafficker.202  The day after the verdict was 
rendered, the victim’s father gave an interview saying that the policeman 
told him during the trial that his daughter was not involved with the drug 
money.203 
The defendants contended that the policeman’s statement was based on 
undisclosed evidence204 and moved for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence.205  The district court, however, deemed the 
policeman’s statement a “mere layman’s opinion as to the victim’s 
connection with drugs.”206  The district court cited the First Circuit’s 
reasoning in pre-Wood United States v. Ranney,207 which held that 
“[i]nadmissible evidence is by definition not material [under Brady], 
because it never would have reached the jury and therefore could not have 
affected the trial outcome.”208  The Rosario-Diaz court relied on Wood for 
the proposition that “[l]ack of disclosure of evidence that is not admissible 
at trial is deemed not ‘material’ under Brady; hence failure to disclose it 
will not be considered a Brady violation.”209  The court applied this to find 
that the policeman’s statement was inherently immaterial under Brady 
because “[o]pinion testimony on the veracity of the testimony of another 
witness is not admissible”210 at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.211 
The Fourth Circuit similarly interprets Wood as holding that inadmissible 
evidence is inherently immaterial.  In Hoke v. Netherland,212 the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the defendant’s granted habeas petition and reinstated a 
death sentence for the rape and murder of a woman in her home.213  The 
defendant argued that his due process rights were violated where the 
prosecution did not disclose police interviews with three men who stated 
they had each in the past had consensual sex with the victim.214  The district 
court permitted the defendant to claim a Brady violation on the basis that 
 
 
 202. See United States v. Montalvo, 20 F. Supp. 2d 270, 272 (D.P.R. 1998). 
 203. See id. at 276 (“[T]he investigator . . . told me ‘Don Samuel your daughter didn’t 
have anything to do with this, she’s innocent.’”). 
 204. See id. at 271. 
 205. See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). 
 206. Montalvo, 20 F. Supp. at 272. 
 207. 719 F.2d 1183 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 208. Id. at 1190 (finding that a witness’s grand jury statement was immaterial because it 
was “inadmissible hearsay because he was merely relating what another salesman had told 
him about [the defendant]”). 
 209. Montalvo, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 277. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the 
form of an opinion is limited to one that is:  (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; 
and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702.”). 
 212. 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 213. See id. at 1352, 1365. 
 214. See id. at 1354. 
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these statements were potentially exculpatory and thus invalidated the 
predicate rape charge.215 
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed and reinstated the defendant’s 
convictions of rape and capital murder.216  The court relied on Wood for the 
proposition that inadmissible evidence can never create a reasonable 
probability that the trial outcome would be altered.217  Stressing that 
because withheld statements “may well have been inadmissible at trial 
under Virginia’s Rape Shield Statute,” the statements were “as a matter of 
law, ‘immaterial’ for Brady purposes,”218 the court found no Brady 
violation.219 
B.   “Factor Courts”:  Admissibility Is a Factor of Materiality 
Several courts of appeal interpret Wood to hold that inadmissible 
evidence may be material for Brady purposes if its disclosure could yield 
admissible evidence.  These courts—the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits—consider admissibility a factor but, not dispositive, of 
materiality.  Within this interpretation are two methods of analysis.  One 
group of courts holds that to be material, the inadmissible evidence’s 
disclosure must lead directly to admissible evidence.220  A second group 
finds that there must be a link between the inadmissible and admissible 
evidence that is based on more than mere speculation.221 
1.   A Direct Lead to Admissible Evidence 
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that inadmissible 
evidence is nonetheless material to a defendant’s due process rights if its 
disclosure would lead directly to admissible evidence.222 
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Wood to mean that failure to disclose 
inadmissible evidence can be a Brady violation if that evidence’s disclosure 
would have led directly to admissible evidence.223  In Coleman v. 
Calderon,224 the Ninth Circuit found no Brady violation where the 
prosecution had failed to disclose information about other murder 
suspects.225  The defendant was convicted of raping and strangling a 
woman to death on a high school football field.226  The police investigated 
 
 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. at 1352. 
 217. See id. at 1356 n.3. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 1358. 
 220. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 221. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 222. See infra notes 224–53 and accompanying text. 
 223. Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d in part, 525 U.S. 141 
(1998). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. at 1117. 
 226. See id. at 1108. 
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and eliminated four other suspects:  the woman’s boyfriend; a man with a 
felony record who had been harassing her; the woman’s violent ex-
boyfriend who had been following her; and a man who had committed a 
rape and kidnapping near the high school.227  The police eliminated these 
suspects because their fingerprints did not match those at the crime scene, 
but the police did not test the suspects’ blood or hair against crime scene 
samples.228 
At trial, the prosecution did not dispute that the police’s failure to test the 
suspects’ DNA against crime scene samples was both favorable and not 
disclosed to the defendant.229  The Ninth Circuit, therefore, considered only 
if the information was “material” such that nondisclosure had violated the 
defendant’s due process rights under Brady.230 
The Ninth Circuit found there was no Brady violation because “[t]o be 
material, evidence must be admissible or must lead to admissible 
evidence.”231  Reasoning that the information about the other suspects was 
immaterial because it was inadmissible at trial232 and there was no reason to 
believe disclosure would have led to the discovery of admissible 
evidence,233 the court found no due process violation.234 
The Eleventh Circuit similarly ruled that inadmissible evidence may be 
material under Brady if its disclosure could lead to admissible evidence.  In 
Wright v. Hopper,235 the court found no Brady violation where the 
prosecution failed to disclose a detective’s inadmissible affidavit.236  The 
defendant had been sentenced to death in the Southern District of Alabama 
for robbery and murder when he and others burglarized a couple’s auto 
store and shot them in the head.237  The defendant argued that his due 
process rights were violated when the prosecution failed to disclose a 
 
 
 227. See id. at 1116. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1116–17. 
 232. See id. at 1117 (“In order for evidence of another suspect to be admissible, there 
must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration 
of the crime.  Motive or opportunity is not enough.” (citation omitted)). 
 233. See id. The court did not articulate the necessary link between inadmissible and 
admissible evidence, but rather stated that:  
Coleman argues that had he been given this information he could have conducted a 
timely investigation which might have uncovered witnesses who saw these other 
suspects bothering [the victim] or being violent towards her.  What is missing in 
Coleman’s argument is any evidence linking any of these other suspects to the 
crime, or any showing that disclosure of their existence would have led to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.  This missing link compels the conclusion that 
the information about the other suspects was not material.  There was no Brady 
violation. 
Id. 
 234. See id. at 1116–17. 
 235. 169 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 236. See id. at 702. 
 237. See id. at 698–99. 
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detective’s affidavit declaring that a woman said her boyfriend—a man 
other than the defendant—owned the gun used in the murders.238 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected the defendant’s argument and 
instead relied on the rule that “[i]nadmissible evidence may be material if 
the evidence would have led to admissible evidence.”239  The detective’s 
affidavit was immaterial because it was inadmissible at trial as hearsay, and 
the defendant failed to demonstrate that its disclosure would have led to 
admissible evidence.240 
The Wright court echoed the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that the 
defendant demonstrate some sort of link between the inadmissible evidence 
and potential admissible evidence for the information to be “material” under 
Brady.241  As in Coleman, however, the Wright court stopped short of 
actually articulating what would suffice as such a link.242 
The Third Circuit has also held that inadmissible evidence may be 
material for Brady purposes if its disclosure would lead to admissible 
evidence.243  Roderick Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for shooting a man to death 
on the side of the road.244  At trial, the prosecution offered no physical 
evidence or eyewitness statement.245  Instead, the prosecution relied 
entirely on a witness’s testimony that Johnson had confessed his guilt to 
him.246  During discovery for his federal habeas claim (ten years after his 
state court conviction), Johnson discovered that the testifying witness was 
 
 
 238. See id. at 701. 
 239. Id. at 703. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Compare id. (“Wright has failed to show that the affidavit would have led to 
admissible evidence . . . .”), with Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“What is missing in Coleman’s argument is any evidence linking any of these other suspects 
to the crime, or any showing that disclosure of their existence would have led to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
 242. See Wright, 169 F.3d at 703 (“Wright has failed to show that the affidavit would 
have led to admissible evidence because he did not call Roberts’s girlfriend as a witness at 
the federal evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, it is unknown exactly what she would say, and 
accordingly, Wright has failed to prove that what she would say is material.  A court cannot 
speculate as to what evidence the defense might have found if the information had been 
disclosed.”).  Perhaps the Wright court felt that pointing out the lack of a link to admissible 
evidence, rather than identifying what would be an acceptable demonstration of a link to 
potential admissible evidence, was sufficient because the Wood holding was itself so 
ambiguous. See id. at 703 n.1 (“In reversing, the [Wood] Court did not declare that 
admissibility was a precondition to materiality.  The Court proceeded to sift through the 
record and, after examining the possible effects that the undisclosed polygraph results would 
have had on the outcome of the trial, concluded that the information was not 
material. . . .  Thus, the Court did not hold that admissibility of undisclosed evidence is a 
prerequisite to materiality.  Accordingly, Wood does not conflict with our decision [that 
inadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible 
evidence].”). 
 243. Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 61 (2013). 
 244. See id. at 125. 
 245. See id. at 120. 
 246. See id. 
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himself under investigation for several armed crimes and cooperating with 
the police as an informant.247 
Johnson claimed that the prosecution’s suppression of the witness’s 
background as a criminal and informant failed to meet the disclosure duty 
under Brady and constituted a violation of his due process rights.248  The 
Third Circuit reasoned that “the materiality standard . . . is not reducible to 
a simple determination of admissibility.”249  Admissibility is a 
“consideration”250 but not dispositive of materiality.251  The court held that 
inadmissible evidence may be material if it could lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence or if it could be used to “impeach or corral” a witness 
at trial.252  The Third Circuit remanded to the district court to determine 
whether information on the witness’s background as a criminal and 
informant would have led to admissible evidence that could reasonably 
have altered the trial outcome.253 
2.   A Link to Admissible Evidence Supported by More Than Speculation 
The Second and Eighth Circuits also hold that inadmissible evidence may 
be material if its disclosure would lead to admissible evidence.  These 
circuits, however, impose a different standard than the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits.  Whereas the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits require that the 
inadmissible evidence lead directly to admissible evidence to be material,254 
the Second and Eighth Circuits demand that the connection between the 
inadmissible and admissible evidence be based on more than “mere 
speculation.”255 
Michael Madsen was convicted of raping a woman in Missouri whom he 
found walking on the side of the road.256  While in Madsen’s house, the 
victim wiped her bloodied hand on a bathroom towel that was later taken 
into police custody.257  The state’s forensic chemist performed a serology 
test on the towel and concluded that the blood type was different from the 
 
 
 247. See id. at 120, 122. 
 248. See id. at 120. 
 249. Id. at 129. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. at 130 (“Even if we were to accept the proposition that suppressed evidence 
must be admissible in order to be material under Brady—which we do not—we could not 
endorse the District Court’s application of such a principle here.”). 
 252. Id. at 129–30; see also James L. Kainen, Truth, Deterrence and the Impeachment 
Exception, 86 OR. L. REV. 1017 (2007) (discussing the use of illegally-obtained evidence to 
impeach defendants but not defense witnesses); Steven Lubet, Understanding Impeachment, 
15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 483 (1992) (discussing the purpose, successful application, and 
results of witness impeachment). 
 253. See Johnson, 705 F.3d at 133. 
 254. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 255. Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court’s 
attempt ‘[t]o get around this problem’ is ‘based on mere speculation.’”); see also Seador, 
supra note 190, at 151. 
 256. See Madsen, 137 F.3d at 603. 
 257. See id. 
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victim’s.258  The forensic chemist noted this in her report, which the state 
provided to Madsen before trial.259  At trial, the state declined to call the 
forensic chemist as a witness, saying that she was unreliable.260  When 
Madsen’s counsel attempted to introduce the serology report to impeach the 
victim’s testimony, the prosecution objected and successfully argued that 
the report was unreliable because the forensic chemist had in the past failed 
blood typing proficiency tests.261 
Madsen complained in his habeas corpus petition that the state violated 
his due process rights by failing to disclose before trial that the forensic 
chemist was actually incompetent to testify.262  The district court agreed 
that the state violated its disclosure duty under Brady, reasoning that the 
nondisclosure precluded Madsen from the opportunity to impeach the 
forensic chemist by procuring his own expert.263 
The Eight Circuit reversed and held that there was no Brady violation.264  
The court cited Wood for its criticism of the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to “get 
around this problem” of admissibility by reasoning that the disclosure of 
polygraph results might have led defense counsel to conduct additional 
discovery, which might have led to admissible evidence.265  The Eighth 
Circuit likewise would require more than “mere speculation” that the 
forensic chemist’s competency was material simply because its disclosure 
could have led to admissible evidence.266 
The Madsen court found the district court’s materiality analysis was 
“based on mere speculation” because 
there [was] nothing in th[e] record which support[ed] the [district] court’s 
apparent assumption underlying its materiality finding that had the seized 
items been tested by a competent chemist, the results would have been the 
same as [the state’s forensic chemist’s]—that is, the blood on the items 
would not be the same type as that of the victim’s blood.267 
The Eighth Circuit interpreted Wood as holding that inadmissible evidence 
may be material for Brady purposes if its disclosure could lead to 
admissible evidence—an analysis requiring more than “mere 
speculation.”268 
The Second Circuit applies a similar materiality analysis by asking if 
there is a credible reason to believe disclosure of the inadmissible evidence 
 
 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. at 604. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. (citing Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see also supra Part I.C. 
 266. Madsen, 137 F.3d at 604. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 605. 
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would lead to admissible evidence.269  In United States v. Persico,270 the 
Second Circuit held that the government’s failure to disclose that its witness 
was also an informant was not a Brady violation because the information 
was immaterial.271 
Robert Zambardi and Carmine Persico, Jr.—participants in a street war 
between factions of a New York City organized crime family—were 
indicted together on racketeering charges.272  At the start of Persico’s jury 
trial, in which he was convicted, Zambardi accepted a guilty plea.273  At 
Persico’s trial, the government relied heavily on the testimony of 
cooperating accomplice witnesses.274  After the trial, the government made 
the “disquieting disclosure[]” that its witness was a long-term FBI 
informant who had lied about his involvement in the interfamily 
violence.275 
Following this disclosure, Zambardi moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea.276  Arguing that he would not have accepted the deal had the 
prosecution revealed this information, Zambardi complained that its 
nondisclosure constituted a violation of his due process rights under 
Brady.277  Had he gone to trial, Zambardi reasoned, he could have used this 
information to impeach the witness.278 
The district court rejected Zambardi’s motion, finding the newly 
disclosed evidence was not material.279  The Second Circuit affirmed, 
criticizing Zambardi’s argument as one that “rests on a sequence of 
hypothetical events all of which are highly speculative and most unlikely to 
have occurred.”280  The court required a less tenuous link to admissible 
 
 
 269. See Seador, supra note 190, at 151. 
 270. 164 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 271. See id. at 805. 
 272. See id. at 798. 
 273. See id. at 798, 800. 
 274. See id. at 799. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. at 800. 
 277. See id. at 800, 805. 
 278. See id. at 805 (“[Zambardi] predicts that if he had gone to trial, the . . . information 
would have been admitted into evidence, that evidence would have significantly reduced the 
chances of his conviction, and, if the information had been disclosed before his plea, he 
would have had sufficient confidence in the admissibility of the information and its likely 
effect on the jury to go to trial and risk exposure to a life sentence instead of the 15 years 
specified in his plea bargain.”). 
 279. See id.  The court applied “the standard for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea, after conviction but before sentencing, on the ground of newly discovered Brady/Giglio 
material.” Id. at 798.  This is an abuse of discretion standard whereby the Second Circuit 
examines whether the district court “exceeded its discretion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) by 
not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea . . . for any fair and just reason.” Id. at 804.  
This procedural inquiry is the platform from which the Second Circuit launches its 
discussion of the materiality standard for a Brady violation. 
 280. Id. at 805. 
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exculpatory evidence that could alter the trial outcome.281  The information 
was immaterial because it was inadmissible as impeachment evidence and 
could only speculatively lead to admissible evidence.282 
C.   “Bagley Courts”:  Admissibility Is Not a Factor of Materiality 
Aside from the courts that find admissibility dispositive of materiality283 
and those that consider admissibility a factor of materiality,284 some courts 
of appeal do not consider admissibility a factor of materiality.  The Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits do not interpret the dicta in Wood and instead apply 
the Bagley and Kyles materiality standard to ask if evidence’s disclosure 
would create a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome, 
regardless of its admissibility.285 
The Seventh Circuit held that evidence is admissible if its disclosure 
would create a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.286  In 
United States v. Silva,287 the court found that an informant’s identity and 
criminal background was immaterial where its disclosure would not have 
been likely to undermine confidence in the jury verdict.288  Pedro Silva was 
indicted in the Northern District of Illinois for various drug offenses.289  
Prior to trial, Silva moved for the government to share information about its 
confidential informant—a man Silva had met with while perpetrating the 
crime.290  The motion was granted, and the prosecution disclosed the 
informant’s identity, background information, and signed statement.291  A 
 
 
 281. See id. (“Even if admissible, it is highly doubtful that the information would have 
lessened the likelihood of Zambardi’s conviction in light of the substantial evidence against 
him.”). 
 282. See id. (“As to possible admissibility, the District Court properly analyzed the 
evidence as it related to Zambardi’s case, and found that the impeachment evidence was not 
material. . . .  If the evidence would not have been admissible, it obviously would not have 
had any influence on the jury.”). 
 283. See supra Part II.A. 
 284. See supra Part II.B. 
 285. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
 286. See United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Martin, 248 F.3d 1161 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming that information about misconduct by Drug 
Enforcement Agency officials who investigated the defendant and testified at trial was 
immaterial because there was no reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would 
have changed the outcome of trial); United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 
1999) (holding that statements from a government witness about stolen Vehicle 
Identification Numbers were immaterial because “[t]he test for materiality under Brady is 
whether, in the absence of the evidence, the defendant received a fair trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence”); Lieberman v. Washington, 128 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(affirming that fingerprint evidence lifted from a rape scene was immaterial under Brady 
despite being admissible because there was no reasonable probability that the evidence’s 
disclosure would have affected the trial outcome). 
 287. 71 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 288. See id. at 671. 
 289. See id. at 668–69. 
 290. See id. at 669. 
 291. See id. 
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jury then convicted Silva of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.292  
After his conviction, Silva learned that a second man he had met with was 
also an informant working with the Drug Enforcement Agency and had an 
extensive criminal background.293 
Silva argued that the government’s failure to disclose the second 
informant’s identity and background violated his right to due process.294  
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed Silva’s conviction, 
holding that the information was immaterial and thus not subject to the 
prosecution’s disclosure duty under Brady.295 
Although the information may have been admissible for impeachment 
use under Giglio,296 the court found the information nonetheless immaterial 
for Brady purposes because the informant’s “credibility was not at issue in 
this trial, and thus evidence to impeach him would have been irrelevant and 
consequently inadmissible.”297  Moreover, there was no strong reason to 
believe that the informant’s direct testimony would have supported Silva’s 
entrapment defense.298  It was, rather, merely an insufficiently “vague 
hope” that this information would alter the trial outcome.299  The court also 
emphasized that the “unsavory nature of an informant is not admissible into 
evidence merely to make the prosecution appear dissolute by 
association.”300  The informant’s identity and background was thus 
immaterial, although potentially admissible as impeachment evidence, 
because there was no “reasonable probability” that its disclosure would 
have supported Silva’s entrapment defense to avert his conviction.301 
The Fifth Circuit similarly holds that evidence is material under Brady if 
its disclosure would create a reasonable probability of a different trial 
outcome.302  Sam Felder worked for a company providing services to a 
residential building for disabled tenants.303  A Texas state court convicted 
Felder of capital murder for stabbing a quadriplegic tenant to death in his 
apartment with surgical scissors.304  In the sentencing phase of trial, 
Felder’s friend testified that Felder admitted the murder to her and 
recounted other crimes he had committed.305  The prosecution did not 
disclose that the witness had previously been arrested for forgery.306 
 
 
 292. See id. 
 293. See id. at 669–70. 
 294. See id. at 670. 
 295. See id. at 670–71. 
 296. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 297. Silva, 71 F.3d at 671 (citation omitted). 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 670. 
 301. Id. at 671. 
 302. Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 303. See id. at 209. 
 304. See id. at 208–09. 
 305. See id. at 209. 
 306. See id. at 211. 
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The Fifth Circuit reviewed Felder’s denied petitions for habeas corpus.307  
Felder argued that the state’s nondisclosure of its witness’s arrest record 
violated his right to due process.308  Had the information been disclosed, 
Felder complained, his attorney would have investigated the arrest and 
could have discovered admissible impeachment evidence on the witness’s 
“reputation for dishonesty.”309 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it had not sufficiently specified 
“how to deal with Brady claims about inadmissible evidence.”310  The court 
therefore asked “only the general question [of] whether the disclosure of the 
evidence would have created a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”311  Applying this standard, the 
court deemed the information on the witness’s history immaterial because 
its disclosure would not have created a reasonable probability of a different 
sentence for Felder.312  Noting that “inadmissible evidence may be material 
under Brady,”313 the Fifth Circuit nonetheless found this information 
immaterial because its disclosure was not likely to have avoided the capital 
sentence.314 
III.   RESOLVING THE CONFLICT:  
RESOLUTION FROM ABOVE, REFORM FROM WITHIN 
Part III of this Note attempts to reconcile the circuit split over when 
inadmissible evidence is material by positing how the Supreme Court 
should rule on the conflict.  This Note ultimately argues, however, that true 
resolution must come from the prosecutor’s office itself. 
This legal conflict has the potential to become a very real function of the 
American criminal defendant’s experience.315  The trial is lauded as “the 
gold standard of American justice.”316  The circuit courts’ disparate 
definitions of “Brady material,”317 however, have the potential to erode the 
truth-seeking foundations of our system.  Given the DOJ’s directive for 
 
 
 307. See id. at 208. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See id. at 213.  Although the Fifth Circuit inquires whether the information’s 
disclosure would have altered the defendant’s “sentence,” it nonetheless applies the standard 
as set forth in Kyles v. Whitley—that information is material if there is a “‘reasonable 
probability’ that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been 
different.” Id. at 212 (emphasis added) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 
(1995)).  The Felder court asks whether the information’s disclosure would have changed 
the defendant’s “sentence” only because, “[o]n appeal, this Brady claim is directed toward 
only the sentence of death, even though [the witness] testified during both the guilt and 
punishment phases” of the capital murder trial. Id. at 211. 
 313. Id. at 212 (quoting Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1005 n.14 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 314. See id. at 212–13. 
 315. See Bornstein et al., supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 316. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012). 
 317. See supra Part II. 
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prosecutors to follow local circuit court practice rather than to attempt a 
uniform discovery policy across jurisdictions,318 the conflict requires a 
timely and effective resolution. 
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split over materiality by 
allowing admissibility as a factor of materiality.  Holding that materiality is 
a function of, although not predicated on, admissibility is in line with the 
prevailing reasoning and a reasonable interpretation of the Court’s prior 
holding in Wood as well as a reflection of the Brady doctrine’s 
underpinnings.  Issues relating to Brady violations may frequently 
punctuate the public discourse,319 and commentators have urged that the 
Supreme Court should decide the issue of when inadmissible evidence is 
nonetheless material.320  The Supreme Court, however, continues to decline 
the invitation, even recently denying certiorari that could have resolved the 
circuit split.321  Although a timely resolution of the problem is important 
given the issue’s significant implications for defendants,322 it is unlikely to 
come from the judiciary. 
This Note ultimately argues for the practitioners and prosecutors 
themselves to address the conflict.  Although this non-doctrinal approach 
would not resolve the split among the circuit courts as would a precedential 
Supreme Court ruling, it would help to ameliorate the issue’s negative 
repercussions in practice.  Part III.A outlines how the Supreme Court 
should resolve the circuit split over how admissibility informs materiality.  
Part III.B then concludes by arguing for alternative means of resolution that 
should be broached from inside the prosecutor’s office. 
A.   Resolution from the Judiciary:  The Supreme Court Should Hold 
That Admissibility Is a Factor of Materiality 
The Supreme Court should resolve the conflict by ruling that 
inadmissible information may nonetheless be material for Brady purposes.  
Finding that admissibility is a factor of materiality would reflect both the 
prevailing circuit courts’ logic and the most reasonable reading of the 
Court’s own prior reasoning in Wood.  Furthermore, this resolution would 
be a prudent reflection of the underpinning of the Court’s holding in Brady 
v. Maryland. 
 
 
 318. See Ogden, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 319. See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Ignore the Brady Rule:  Evidence Must Be Shared, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/29/opinion/la-ed-brady-
20131229. 
 320. See, e.g., Abigail B. Scott, No Secrets Allowed:  A Prosecutor’s Obligation to 
Disclose Inadmissible Evidence, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 867 (2012). 
 321. See supra note 243. 
 322. See Bornstein et al., supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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1.   The Prevailing Logic 
The prevailing reasoning among the circuit courts is that inadmissible 
information can be material so long as its disclosure would yield admissible 
evidence.323  This middle-of-the-road324 concept of materiality is, 
nonetheless, nuanced with two interpretations of the extent to which the 
inadmissible evidence must lead to admissible evidence.325  Whether 
inadmissible evidence must lead directly to admissible evidence or be 
linked to admissible evidence by more than speculation, each approach 
imposes a limit on what could be considered an otherwise endless causation 
link.  Capping off the extent to which the court will follow a trail of 
hypothetical breadcrumbs to admissible evidence has the appealing effect of 
supporting judicial efficiency. 
Accepting a direct or very strong link to admissible evidence as the 
standard for materiality is, furthermore, a reasonable interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s holding that evidence is material if its disclosure would 
create a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial.326  
Introducing admissible evidence would clearly alter a trial’s disposition, but 
inadmissible evidence could also affect the trial outcome if it could strongly 
inform the defendant’s case.  Holding that only admissible evidence could 
change a trial outcome would be too narrow of an understanding of the 
nuances that affect a trial.  Holding that admissibility is a factor of 
materiality allows the defendant to make an argument for the information’s 
potential impact, but requires a strong argument rooted in more than 
speculation.  Ruling that inadmissible information may be material if its 
disclosure could yield admissible evidence is the most reasonable way to 
safeguard an important constitutional right while preventing the trial 
process from unraveling into an open-ended series of inefficiencies. 
2.   The Reasonable Reading of Wood 
Ruling that inadmissible evidence may be material if its disclosure could 
yield admissible evidence reflects a reasonable reading of the Court’s prior 
holding in Wood v. Bartholomew.327  Although the Court found that 
inadmissible polygraph results were immaterial because such inadmissible 
information could not reasonably alter the trial outcome, it did not rule that 
inadmissible evidence is per se immaterial.328 
The Court held that the evidence was immaterial because it was 
inadmissible, but also discussed in dicta that the defendant’s argument (that 
the results were material because they could have led to admissible 
 
 
 323. See supra Part II.B. 
 324. Compare supra Part II.A, with Part II.C. 
 325. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 326. See supra Part I.C. 
 327. See supra Part I.C. 
 328. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); see also supra Part I.C. 
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evidence) was too tenuous.329  The Court did not hold that the defendant’s 
reasoning was wrong, but rather simply rejected it as insufficiently 
supported in fact.330  This is reflected in the prevailing circuit court 
approach that inadmissible evidence can be material if its disclosure either 
would lead directly to admissible evidence or is linked to admissible 
evidence through more than speculation. 
3.   Reflections of Brady’s Purpose 
Holding that admissibility is a factor of materiality is the appropriate 
resolution because it would support the Court’s reasoning in prior Brady 
rule jurisprudence.  The Brady rule is not a discovery doctrine but rather an 
assertion of the defendant’s due process rights.331  As such, it calls for a 
conception of materiality that is broad enough to avoid constitutional 
violations but limited enough to avoid causing unnecessary inefficiencies.  
As a public servant, the prosecutor is charged with safeguarding the 
defendant’s due process rights.332 
Post-Brady jurisprudence expanded the Brady holding to reflect the 
prosecutor’s duty to uphold constitutional rights.333  The Court should 
resolve this conflict by finding admissibility a factor of materiality to give 
the prosecutor enough of a framework to reinforce her duty to safeguard 
due process rights but also enough leeway to pursue an adversarial trial. 
B.   Reform from Within the Prosecutor’s Office 
In 2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue of how 
admissibility informs materiality.334  As a result, this Note argues that the 
conflict must be addressed from within the prosecutor’s office.  As the 
architect of the proceedings,335 the prosecutor has access to information and 
investigative resources often far outweighing that of the defendant.  The 
prosecutor alone is responsible for reviewing information for disclosable 
Brady material.336  As the advocate imbued with such extraordinary power, 
the prosecutor must maintain a critical eye on her own process and 
diligence. 
 
 
 329. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 8. 
 331. See Curry v. United States, 658 A.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 332. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 334. See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 61 
(2013). 
 335. See supra note 122. 
 336. See supra note 112. 
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1.   Open File Discovery:  Eyes Wide Shut 
Because the prosecutor serves as the check on her own discovery and 
disclosure practice,337 commentators have proposed that prosecutors adopt 
an “open file” discovery policy.338  Requiring the prosecution to 
automatically give defense counsel the entire investigation record may 
reduce the risk of Brady violations by essentially eliminating the 
prosecutor’s role as the sole filter for disclosable material.  Although an 
open file policy would give defense counsel the chance to review the 
information, it runs the risk of flooding public defender offices with 
tremendous amounts of information that may or may not be relevant to the 
materiality inquiry.339  Open file discovery is therefore appealing as a way 
to avoid Brady violations by broadening the reach of disclosure but may 
have the unwanted effect of simply shuffling the review responsibility to 
the defense.  This may, in turn, result in system inefficiencies and could 
diminish the prosecutor’s unique role as both public servant and litigator.340 
This inefficiency is further compounded by inefficacy.  Applied to the 
criminal context, open file discovery fails not only to achieve its own 
purpose but also to solve the Brady problem.  Specifically, open discovery 
may unblock the flow of information to the defendant but not necessarily 
from the defendant to the prosecution,341 therefore failing to engender a 
reciprocal information exchange.342  A reciprocal exchange is, furthermore, 
 
 
 337. See supra note 112. 
 338. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants:  Responding to Injustice, 57 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619, 641 (2007) (advocating for “open file” discovery to give defense 
attorneys greater access to potential Brady material); Brian Gregory, Note, Brady Is The 
Problem:  Wrongful Convictions and the Case for “Open File” Criminal Discovery, 46 
U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 822 (2012) (arguing that a “system of ‘open file’ discovery in criminal 
cases would go far to remedy the problems with respect to wrongful convictions that have 
manifested as a result of the modern interpretation of the Brady rule”). 
 339. See, e.g., Ira Mickenberg, A Practical Guide to Brady Motions:  Getting What You 
Want; Getting What You Need, NEW FELONY DEFENDER TRAINING, CHAPEL HILL, N.C. 
(Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2008%20New%20Felony% 
20Defender%20Training/BradyHandout.pdf (“The Problem of ‘Open File’ Discovery”). 
 340. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 341. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“While the 
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, [the defendant] need not disclose the barest outline 
of his defense.  He is immune from question or comment on his silence . . . .”); State v. 
Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 885 (N.J. 1953) (“[T]he state is completely at the mercy of the defendant 
who can produce surprise evidence at the trial . . . .”); see also H. Lee Sarokin & William E. 
Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?  Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie 
This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1991) (“[A] criminal defendant’s fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination would limit disclosure by the defense even if the 
government’s case were subject to open discovery, and the information would flow only one 
way.”). 
 342. Some states are, however, legislating to create “broad, reciprocal discovery regimes” 
under which the criminal defendant can receive information from the prosecution if the 
defendant agrees to disclose useful trial information including witness lists or test results. 
Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1622–23 & n.137 (2005); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15A-902 (2004).  That not all states are legislating for broad reciprocal discovery is, 
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not necessarily the remedy to a Brady complaint; the goal is for the 
prosecutor to share information with the defendant.343 
The prosecutor’s duty to disclose is sufficiently unclear that DOJ advises 
its prosecutors to simply “err on the side” of disclosure.344  Yet, disclosure 
discrepancies and varied practices persist.  Rather than, yet again, 
attempting to redefine the disclosure duty,345 the conflict will most 
successfully be resolved by actually enforcing the prosecutor’s policy of 
broad disclosure.346  The merit of open file discovery is its recognition that 
enduring change must be affected from within the prosecutor’s office.  It is, 
nonetheless, a passive approach that would essentially skirt the issue. 
2.   The Case for a Permanent Task Force 
An active and self-critical approach to reform is the implementation of a 
permanent prosecutorial task force.  The USAO has in the past developed a 
“working group” of attorneys to examine Brady disclosure practices.347  
Indeed, this group’s findings were reflected in the Ogden Memo.348  The 
Ogden Memo, however, did more to shine a light on the issue of varying 
disclosure practices than it did to fix it.349 
The prosecutor is already recognized as the player with the power to 
implement a system of self-checks to ensure disclosure integrity.350  The 
DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility is charged with investigating 
allegations of misconduct related to the prosecutor’s investigation and 
litigation of a case.351  This review process is inherently retrospective; an 
allegation of misconduct must first occur to trigger the internal review. 
 
 
moreover, a further example of how the Ogden Memo’s mandate for federal prosecutors to 
follow their local jurisdiction’s disclosure practices does more to highlight than to fix the 
issue of disparate Brady practice. See infra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence:  Avoiding the Agurs Problems 
of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 393 (1984) 
(“The crucial distinction between Brady and an open file rule is that Brady requires 
disclosure only of evidence favorable to the defendant.”). 
 344. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 346. See Editorial, supra note 136 (“The Brady problem is in many ways structural.  
Prosecutors have the task of deciding when a piece of evidence would be helpful to the 
defense.  But since it is their job to believe in the defendant’s guilt, they have little incentive 
to turn over, say, a single piece of exculpatory evidence when they are sitting on what they 
see as a mountain of evidence proving guilt.”). 
 347. See Ogden, supra note 20. 
 348. See id. 
 349. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  But see Ensuring That Federal 
Prosecutors Meet Discovery Obligations:  Hearing on S. 2197 Before the S. Comm. on the  
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. 
of Justice) (testifying that the DOJ disclosure misconduct in the prosecution of U.S. Senator 
Ted Stevens did “not suggest a systemic problem warranting a significant departure from 
longstanding criminal justice practices” because it was “an aberration”). 
 350. See supra note 115. 
 351. Office of Professional Responsibility, DOJ, available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/ 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
1536 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
A permanent task force dedicated to managing disclosure practice would, 
by contrast, review disclosure practice as the investigation and litigation 
happens.  A group of prosecutors in each office would vet its peers’ 
disclosure determinations for potentially material exculpatory evidence.  
Rather than reviewing their colleagues’ disclosure review process to meet 
the “local” practice,352 which would simply perpetuate the conflict of 
disparate disclosure, the permanent task force would ensure its office’s 
practice meets the expansive and inclusive disclosure policy espoused in the 
Ogden Memo.353 
A successful task force of peers would set concrete standards for what 
suffices as a broad and diligent review for Brady material, which each 
prosecutor would be required to meet at set intervals for every case on her 
docket.354  Although implementing a permanent task force would require 
substantial resources and is not likely to influence Brady violations until 
prosecutors commit to it as an administrative system, the proactive effort 
from within the prosecutor’s office would likely be welcomed as a fresh 
response and affirmation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s role as justice 
seeker.355 
3.   Redrafting the System:  The Architect’s Design 
A permanent task force may address the practical issue of disparate 
disclosure policies across prosecutor offices but would have little impact by 
way of resolving the discrete conflict at issue in this Note:  whether 
inadmissible evidence is nonetheless material for Brady purposes.  A 
second approach of affirmative self-reform from within the prosecutor’s 
office is to support the drafting of a model statute proposing changed 
disclosure policies. 
Commentators have argued for independent parties to intervene by 
setting “clearer rules and statutes by independent parties, as opposed to a 
working group made up of ‘senior prosecutors.’”356  Public interest groups 
and criminal defense attorneys have similarly proposed related model 
 
 
 352. See Ogden, supra note 20.  Local discovery practices are not only noncohesive as a 
whole but can often be incoherent as stand-alone practices. See, e.g., Brian R. Gallini, Help 
Wanted:  Seeking One Good Appellate Brief That Forces the Arkansas Supreme Court to 
Clarify Its Criminal Discovery Jurisprudence, 2009 ARK. L. NOTES 97, 98 (noting that 
“Arkansas has yet to conclusively provide an answer to [the] important question” of whether 
a prosecutorial nondisclosure violates the defendant’s federal or state constitutional rights). 
 353. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 343, at 397 (“[T]he flaw of Brady is in allowing the 
prosecutor to determine initially whether evidence should be turned over.”). 
 354. See, e.g., Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs:  Why We 
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 
(2010) (proposing a model internal review process for district attorney’s offices). 
 355. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 356. Ellen Podgor, New DOJ Discovery Policies Fall Short, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF. 
BLOG (Jan. 5, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2010/01/new-
doj-discovery-policies.html. 
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rules.357  In 2012, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska proposed the Fairness 
in Disclosure of Evidence Act358 in response to what DOJ found was 
reckless prosecutorial misconduct in the 2008 corruption trial of Senator 
Ted Stevens.359  The proposed legislation posed to essentially moot the 
materiality factor of the prosecutor’s exculpatory evidence disclosure 
obligation by imposing a uniform disclosure requirement of “all favorable 
information to the accused.”360  Attorney General James Cole contended, in 
response, that the proposed legislation’s enactment would entail three 
negative consequences:  (1) placing an administrative burden on 
prosecutors; (2) opening witnesses and victims to potential intimidation and 
harm; and (3) risking a threat to national security by potentially disclosing 
classified information.361 
Reforms to the prosecutor’s practice, however, should be rooted in the 
prosecutor’s own insight.  Rather than adding to the voluminous list of 
outside sources imposing a definition of the disclosure duty,362 the 
prosecutor should herself instigate the drafting of a new standard that 
reflects the practical application of a broad disclosure practice.363  
Codifying the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation in legislation drafted with 
prosecutors’ direct input speaks to the DOJ’s current interest in imposing 
standards to monitor its own conduct.364 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split over whether 
inadmissible evidence is material for Brady purposes because the issue has 
immediate implications for the safeguarding of both due process rights and 
individual defendants’ treatment.  Although the Brady rule was intended to 
uphold constitutional rights, its application in practice has become 
alarmingly inexact.  The Court’s ambiguous opinion in Wood v. 
Bartholomew further obfuscated the issue of admissibility and materiality 
for the already splintering circuit courts.  While the Court should rule that 
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inadmissible information is material if its disclosure could yield admissible 
evidence, yet another judicial opinion defining the prosecutor’s duty to 
disclose may be unlikely to clarify the confusion.  Because the prosecutor 
alone is imbued with the unique power to both safeguard justice and 
achieve rightful convictions, reform must instead come from within the 
prosecutor’s office. 
 
